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We live in a constantly changing environment and 
change detection is important in order to efficiently function 
in the world that surrounds us. Our sensory organs are bi-
ased to register changes in a sense that they stop responding 
during continuous presentation of a nonvariant stimulus, so 
it would seem reasonable to assume that we are generally 
good at this task. This would correspond to our experience 
of a rich and vivid visual world and an intuitive notion of 
having detailed visual representations at all times. However, 
studies related to change detection, a process of apprehend-
ing changes in the world around us, have shown that this 
notion may be somewhat flawed. 
Last decade has been marked by an increasing interest in 
the process of change detection prompted by numerous stud-
ies that have provided evidence for observers’ unexpected 
difficulties in noticing even large changes to visual scenes 
(Simons & Levin, 1997). This inability to detect changes in 
scenes from one glance to another, also known as “change 
blindness”, was at first taken as evidence of scarce repre-
sentations of visual scenes and small amount of information 
being preserved in visual short-term memory (e.g. Rensink, 
2000). However, as Simons and Ambinder (2005) argue, 
this interpretation represents only one possible explanation, 
because a successful process of change detection needs 
more than a sufficiently detailed representation of the scene 
before the change. Therefore, change blindness could occur 
for other reasons, such as the inability to compare represen-
tations of pre- and post-change scenes (e.g. Simons, 2000). 
One of the most often proposed mechanisms for change 
blindness states that the post-change display simply masks 
or overwrites the first picture (Enns & DiLollo, 2000), thus 
disrupting the representation of the first scene which could 
have been used as a reference for comparison with the sec-
ond representation. However, Simons, Chabris, Schnur and 
Levin (2002) have shown that overwriting cannot entirely 
account for change blindness because observers that had not 
detected changes in certain trials of their study were never-
theless able to recognize pre-change stimuli. Thus, it seems 
likely that, at least for some conditions, change blindness 
could reflect a failure to compare the two scenes. 
Numerous studies have attempted to analyze the process 
of change detection, the mechanisms that underlie it and the 
factors that influence it. One element that has been widely 
acknowledged as important for change detection is atten-
tion. One evidence of the importance of attention comes 
from a study by Rensink, O’Regan and Clark (1997) who 
have shown, using a flicker task, that observers are better at 
detecting changes at regions that were rated as more inter-
esting before the experiment. In a similar vein, Kelley, Chun 
and Chua (2003) have shown that changes to the central 
elements of the scene are more easily detected than other 
changes of equal physical salience, while Simons and Levin 
(1998) noted that change blindness occurs when changes 
occur unexpectedly and thus remain unattended. Individual 
characteristics can also be an important factor in change 
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detection process, as can be seen from a study conducted 
by Jones, Jones Smith and Copley (2003), who have shown 
that social drug users are more likely to detect changes in 
pictures depicting drugs than non-users. On the other hand, 
Scholl (2000) has shown that using exogenous cues to draw 
attention to the location of change can also be efficient in 
reducing change blindness. 
Since change blindness occurs when attention is divert-
ed from the signal, Rensink (2002) proposes that attention is 
crucial in constructing a limited number of comparisons of 
relatively complex structures that become basis for change 
detection. Henderson and Hollingworth (1999) have shown 
that saccade direction and fixation position play an important 
role in determining whether changes will be noticed, but, 
interestingly, O’Regan, Deubel, Clark & Rensink (2000) 
state that changes may go unnoticed even when the subject 
looks directly at the location containing a change. Similarly, 
Williams and Simons (2000) have shown that changes of 
attended objects can also go unnoticed. In conclusion, the 
aforementioned findings suggest that the relationship be-
tween attention and detection is not symmetrical: although 
attention is needed for successful detection of changes, it 
might not be sufficient. 
Although attentional involvement may not by itself guar-
antee successful change detection, nevertheless its relevance 
cannot be ignored. However, it is important to consider the 
fact that attention is not a unitary phenomenon. Namely, at-
tention allocation can be guided by two distinct classes of 
factors, endogenous and exogenous ones (Yantis, 2000). En-
dogenous or top-down factors include our goals, intentions 
and internal states, giving the characteristics of the outside 
world that are compatible with our template a greater prob-
ability of being attended. On the other hand, attention can 
be directed in a stimulus-driven or bottom-up manner. This 
refers to the situations when the attention is captured by sa-
lient features of the environment, even in situations when 
they are task irrelevant. Turatto and Mazza (2004) suggested 
that top-down and bottom-up factors act together to create 
an “activation map”, a biased representation of the external 
world in which each element of the visual field is represent-
ed according to its relevance and salience. Therefore, when 
presented with a visual display we first direct our attention 
towards the most important or salient elements, which are 
then followed by other elements, depending on their level 
of activation. It is not only perception, but also change de-
tection that depends on levels of activation of different ele-
ments: changes can be noticed faster when they are associ-
ated with high priority items. An item of “high priority” can 
be an element which is either central to the meaning of the 
scene or visually distinct (Rensink et al., 1997). In line with 
this conclusion are the previously mentioned studies which 
used different types of cues in order to show that both bot-
tom-up (e.g. Scholl, 2000) and top-down (e.g. Kelley et al., 
2003) attentional biases are important for successful change 
detection. In other words, if the change occurs to a salient, 
clearly visible element of the scene, it will be more easily 
noticed than if it occurs to some other, less pronounced part 
of the scene. Also, changes in the scene will be more easily 
noticed if they occur to an element which is either person-
ally important to the observer (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2005) or 
necessary for the successful completion of a concurrent task 
(Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003). 
The results of the abovementioned research, while prov-
ing that different types of attentional bias may be present 
concurrently, do not provide us with the method with which 
to compare or mutually relate their influences. It is hard to 
speculate what would happen in situations where both top-
down and bottom-up attentional bias were present, each 
pointed in a different direction, so that one of them would 
facilitate the change direction, while the other would inter-
fere with it. It would be hard to predict which one of these 
biases would be stronger, how they would interact or jointly 
affect observer’s performance. Thus, the present study was 
designed in order to address the relationship and the inter-
action between top-down and bottom-up attentional bias in 
change detection. We manipulated these two types of atten-
tional bias and addressed both their individual influences 
and the effects of their interaction.
METHOD
Participants 
A total of 23 participants, 19-22 years old psychology 
students with normal or corrected vision, participated in the 
study and received credits for their participation. 
Procedure
Experiment was designed using SuperLab and run on 
a PC computer with a 640 × 350 monitor resolution. The 
participants were seated 40 cm in front of the computer and 
presented with sets of stimuli used in a flicker paradigm. 
Each stimulus trial included an alternating presentation of 
two stimulus pictures which both lasted for 400 ms and 
were separated by a 200 ms interstimulus interval, during 
which a blank screen (white mask) was presented. Each pic-
ture included two distinct 6-digit sets of numbers placed one 
on top of the other and separated by a thin gray line. The 
numbers were presented on a white background. The two 
alternating pictures in “change trials” differed in the identity 
of one of the numbers (digits) presented in either set while 
in “no-change trials” there was no difference between the 
two pictures. The alternations of initial and changed stimu-
lus were repeated 5 times, so that each trial throughout the 
experiment contained the presentation of 10 individual pic-
tures. The alternation of the stimuli was not stopped in cases 
when the participant noticed the change, but continued until 
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the end of the trial. The example of the stimulus used is 
presented in Figure 1.
In order to manipulate bottom-up attentional bias, the 
color of the numbers presented in the picture was alternated 
during the trials. Color was chosen because it represents 
one of the stimulus features which can be used to efficiently 
guide attention (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). In the no-bias 
condition both sets of numbers were gray, while in the bot-
tom-up biased conditions one of the sets was red. In order to 
manipulate top-down attentional bias, the participants were 
given instructions to direct their attention to a particular part 
of the picture (Hoffman, 1998) and this was accomplished 
by presenting a small black fixation cross on the screen be-
fore the trial. The cross was used to indicate where the par-
ticipants should direct their attention during the trial: on the 
whole picture (cross presented in the middle of the screen), 
on the upper (cross presented in the center of upper part of 
the screen) or lower set of numbers (cross presented in the 
center of the lower part of the screen). Thus, focusing par-
ticipants’ attention at the whole picture created no specific 
bias while the instructions to direct attention either on the 
upper or the lower set did. The exact duration of the fixation 
cross’ appearance on the monitor was set by participants: 
after the end of each trial a fixation cross would appear to 
instruct them about the upcoming trial. The trial started after 
the participants pressed a space bar.
Participants’ task was to detect the change and quickly 
respond by pressing the marked keyboard key. If the trial 
contained no change participants were instructed not to re-
spond until the end of the trial. The task of responding only 
to change trials was chosen because in no-change trials the 
participants would not be able to correctly identify images 
as “same” until the trial was already finished.
A within-subject design was used, with a total of 54 
change trials (6 per experimental condition) and the same 
number of no-change trials, which were presented to each of 
the participants in three blocks of measurement. Each of the 
created displays (number arrangements within the picture) 
was presented three times during the experiment, with dif-
ferent instructions given to the participants (directing their 
attention to the whole picture, to the lower or upper set of 
numbers). Changes in the stimuli could occur in either set, 
upper or lower one, regardless of the color of the stimuli or 
the focus of attention, as directed by the instructions. Trials 
were presented quasi-randomly within each of the blocks 
(each block contained all types of trials) and were inter-
leaved with no-change trials which served as a control of 
the accuracy of participants’ reactions. The order of blocks 
was rotated between participants. Participants were given a 
practice period before the experiment. 
Trials throughout the experiment differed in the pres-
ence of top-down and bottom-up attentional bias, so they 
could either include: a) no attentional bias (both sets of 
numbers gray and instruction to direct attention to the whole 
picture); b) only top-down bias (both sets of numbers gray 
and instruction to direct attention to one set of numbers); c) 
only bottom-up bias (one red and one gray set of numbers 
and instruction to direct attention to the whole picture) or d) 
both top-down and bottom-up bias (one red and one gray set 
of numbers and instruction to direct attention to one set of 
numbers), with biases being either congruent (instruction to 
direct attention to red numbers) or incongruent (instruction 
to direct attention to gray numbers). In all change-trials in 
no-bias situations changes could occur in either set of num-
bers with equal probability. In situations where attentional 
bias was present, changes could occur either in the attended 
Figure 1. An example of stimulus display (darker color represents red and lighter represents gray from the original display)
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or the unattended set with equal probability (50%). The lay-
out of the display, namely the distribution of numbers on the 
display, the position of the highlighted set of numbers and 
of the set of numbers in which the change takes place were 
randomly chosen and had equal probability of occurrence. 
Overall there were nine experimental situations present 
within the experiment: 
- baseline/neutral situation: two gray sets of numbers pre-
sented; participants direct attention to both sets; changes 
could occur in either set 
- bottom-up facilitation: one set of numbers red, the other 
gray; participants directed attention to both sets; changes 
occurred in the highlighted (red) set of numbers
- bottom-up interference: one set of numbers red, the other 
gray; participants directed attention to both sets; changes 
occurred in the non-highlighted (gray) set of numbers
- top-down facilitation: two gray sets of numbers present; 
changes occurred in the set of numbers participants were 
instructed to attend
- top-down interference: two gray sets of numbers present; 
changes occurred in the set of numbers participants were 
instructed not to attend
- joint top-down and bottom-up facilitation: one set of 
numbers red, the other gray; changes occurred in the red 
set of numbers that the participants were instructed to 
attend
- top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference: one 
set of numbers red, the other gray; changes occurred in 
the gray set of numbers participants were instructed to 
attend
- top-down interference and bottom-up facilitation: one 
set of numbers red, the other gray; changes occurred in 
the red set of numbers while participants were instructed 
to attend to the gray
- joint top-down and bottom-up interference: one set of 
numbers red, the other gray; changes occurred in the 
gray set of numbers while participants were instructed 
to attend to the red one.
RESULTS
The accuracy and the occurrence of change detection, 
that is, the number of scene alternations identified by the 
participants, were recorded. All participants had 90% or 
higher accuracy rates in no-change trials (the number of 
false alarms was under 10%). The distribution of reactions 
in change trials in all experimental situations were not sta-
tistically different from normal [Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
were not significant (p>.05) in all situations], so parametric 
statistics were used in all of the remaining analyses. 
The efficiency or success of change detection across dif-
ferent situations was measured by using proportion of trials 
in which the participants correctly detected the presented 
change (possible range: 0-1). The average proportion of 
perceived changes for each experimental situation (Figure 
2) was calculated and further analyzed in order to see if the 
efficiency of change detection differed under different at-
tentional demands. 
Figure 2. The efficiency of change detection (percentage of correct change detections) in different experimental conditions
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Legend
base baseline/neutral situation
TD(f) top-down facilitation situation
BU(f) bottom-up facilitation situation
TD(f)+BU(f) top-down and bottom-up facilitation situation
TD(i) top-down interference situation
BU(i) bottom-up interference situation
TD(i)+BU(i) top-down and bottom-up interference situation
TD(f)+BU(i) top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference situation
TD(i)+BU(f) top-down  interference and bottom-up facilitation situation
Figure 3. The speed of change detection (number of alternations) in different experimental conditions
Repeated measures two-way ANOVA were used in order 
to test the influence of two factors: top-down attentional bias 
(3 levels: no top-down, top-down facilitation and top-down 
interference) and bottom-up attentional bias (3 levels: no 
bottom-up, bottom-up facilitation and bottom-up interfer-
ence). Results showed a significant main effect of top-down 
attentional bias (F (2, 88) = 10.59, p<.01; effect size: partial 
eta squared .325), while post-hoc Bonferroni pairwise com-
parison revealed significant differences between the top-
down attentional facilitation conditions, when compared to 
the top-down interference (p<.01) and conditions without 
an top-down attentional bias (p<.05). The main effect of 
bottom-up bias (F(2, 88) = 2.04, p>.05) and the interaction 
(F (4, 88) = .92, p>.05) did not reach statistical significance. 
The differences between particular experimental situations 
were tested using paired t-tests (Table 1).
In addition to success of change detection which was 
used as the main index of detection efficiency, information 
related to the speed of change detection was recorded. We 
identified trials in which changes were successfully detected 
by each respondent, and registered when (at which alterna-
tion) during the trial this occurred. The average number of 
alternations before the response was calculated for each con-
dition (taking into account only responses from participants 
who made a correct detection) and the results are shown 
in Figure 3. Since the obtained results related to this vari-
able showed a trend highly comparable to that of success 
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of change detection, this measure provided little additional 
information and was not further statistically analyzed. 
DISCUSSION
The present experiment addressed the efficiency of 
change detection for stimuli that employ our attentional re-
sources in different ways: on the one hand, those that the 
participants attend in contrast to those which they ignore 
(top-down attentional bias) and, on the other, those which 
by the virtue of their salience create a bottom-up atten-
tional bias in contrast to those which are not accentuated 
(bottom-up attentional bias). The obtained results reveal a 
statistically significant main effect of top-down attentional 
bias. Instructing participants to direct attention on one set of 
numbers and introducing a change in the attended set creat-
ed a facilitation effect, as reflected by more accurate change 
detection process in top-down facilitation conditions, when 
compared to baseline and top-down interference conditions. 
The influence of manipulating bottom-up attentional bias 
and the interaction between the two variables was not statis-
tically significant. 
Looking only at this level, the obtained results seem to 
show a rather simple pattern. However, this is somewhat 
misleading, because the present study taps into two differ-
ent issues, and this was only partly intended. One of them, 
namely the relation between the two types of attentional 
biases, represents the main focus and is, therefore, prima-
rily discussed. However, in order to account for different 
potential directions of influences of these two factors, the 
design of this experiment included both interfering and fa-
cilitating types of effects. The comparison between the rela-
tive strengths of these effects within each attentional bias 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but this issue by itself 
Table 1
Comparisons (results of paired t-tests) of success of change detection between pairs of experimental situations
Condition
Success of change detection
t df p
baseline vs. bottom-up facilitation 0.14 22 .89
baseline vs. bottom-up interference 1.50 22 .15
baseline vs. top-down facilitation -1.18 22 .25
baseline vs. top-down interference 0.45 22 .66
baseline vs. top-down and bottom-up facilitation -1.31 22 .20
baseline vs. top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference -1.32 22 .20
baseline vs. bottom-up facilitation and top-down interference 1.68 22 .11
baseline vs. bottom-up and top-down interference 2.73 22 .01*
bottom-up facilitation vs. bottom-up interference 2.15 22 .04*
top-down facilitation vs. top-down interference 1.18 22 .25
bottom-up facilitation vs. top-down and bottom-up facilitation 1.37 22 .19
top-down facilitation vs. top-down and bottom-up facilitation 0.0002 22 1.0
bottom-up interference vs. bottom-up and top-down interference -2.37 22 .3
top-down interference vs. bottom-up and top-down interference -1.74 22 .94
bottom-up facilitation vs. bottom-up facilitation and top-down interference 1.76 22 .09
top-down facilitation vs. top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference 0.09 22 .93
top-down facilitation vs. bottom-up facilitation 1.14 22 .27
top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference vs. bottom-up facilitation and top-down interference 2.80 22 .01*
top-down and bottom-up facilitation vs. top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference 0.13 22 .89
top-down and bottom-up facilitation vs. bottom-up facilitation and top-down interference 3.49 22 .002**
top-down and bottom-up facilitation vs. bottom-up and top-down interference 4.42 22 .001**
bottom-up and top-down interference vs. top-down facilitation and bottom-up interference -4.66 22 .001**
bottom-up and top-down interference vs. bottom-up facilitation and top-down interference -1.51 22 .15
Note. *p<.05; **p<.01
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could be interesting to address within further studies. If well 
manipulated, it could provide a way to test potential impli-
cations of the provisory conclusion from the Introduction 
which stated that attention may be needed, but not sufficient 
for change detection. In hope that the present study might 
help in formulating the questions, pairways comparisons 
between individual experimental conditions are presented 
in Table 1.
The efficiency of change detection within the present 
study was evaluated based on the proportion of trials in 
which participants correctly identified the change. In addi-
tion, we also recorded data reflecting the speed of change 
detection which were not statistically analyzed in the same 
degree as the principal measure of change detection success. 
More specifically, since each trial included an alternation 
of 10 pictures it was possible to record the number of al-
ternations which were needed in order to notice the change 
in conditions in which this actually occurred. Based on the 
number of alternations, it would also be possible to calculate 
respective reaction times which would serve as a more sen-
sitive measure of detection speed. Since the principal ques-
tion of this study was a more “general“ one, we believed 
it would be more appropriate to base the interpretations of 
the obtained results on one, somewhat more robust meas-
ure of change detection efficiency, but nevertheless present 
the descriptive values of the speed of change detection for 
each condition for the interested reader. Keeping in mind 
that the lack of statistical power prevents any strong inter-
pretations or claims, it might be interesting to notice that, 
in principle, more accurate change detection process was 
principally coupled with somewhat faster reactions. Values 
reflecting detection speed indicate a trend which is compa-
rable to the one reflected in the success of change detection, 
based on which it is possible to speculate that the accuracy 
of change detection does not come at the expense of speed. 
If the change was not noticeable to the participants, adding 
more alternations did not lead to an improvement of per-
formance. 
Additionally, it needs to be stated that the exact interpre-
tation regarding the meaning and the relationship between 
these two measures represents somewhat of an empirical 
question. They probably reflect rather different aspects of 
the change detection process and definitely differ in their 
sensitivity. Since the present study included quite a lot of 
experimental conditions, one of these measures was used 
as a principal indicator of change detection efficiency. We 
chose to focus only on this one because the alternative of 
adding both measures, especially given rather converging 
interpretations which could be based on them, did not have 
significant additional informative value. It would be very in-
teresting to try and address the process of change detection 
with more scrutiny and better characterize different alter-
native measures which can be used for describing its effi-
ciency. This should, however, be done in a more systematic 
fashion than the present study allowed.
Overall, the results obtained within this study are some-
what complex and cannot be interpreted in a simple and 
unequivocal manner, and this might be attributed to the 
choice of paradigm as well as the exact procedure used in 
the experiment. Therefore, they should not be taken as defi-
nite indicators of the relationship between different types of 
attentional biases and their role in change detection because 
a different operationalization of stimuli and procedure could 
have resulted in a different pattern of results.
When interpreting the results one could, on one hand, 
speculate about a generally stronger influence of top-down 
attentional bias in change detection. However, it is impor-
tant to note that results could partially reflect the nature of 
used stimuli, namely numbers which were somewhat arbi-
trarily chosen. As abstract cognitive concepts, numbers may 
require additional cognitive processing and could generally 
be under more top-down influences when compared to some 
other types of stimuli. One salient bottom-up feature of the 
numbers is their shape which presumably activates recogni-
tion (top-down process) which could interfere with poten-
tial influences of other bottom-up features such as color. 
Therefore, the obtained results may not be easily extended 
to other types of visual materials.
Additional problem with the manipulation of the bot-
tom-up attentional bias refers to the fact that in our proce-
dure we made one set of numbers more salient using color 
as a distinctive attribute, basing this decision on relevant 
literature data (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004) as well as some of 
our preliminary measurements conducted while preparing 
this experiment. However, since we did not accentuate only 
one (changing) digit, but the whole set of digits (equivalent 
to top-down attentional bias) we are probably underestimat-
ing “the power” of bottom-up attentional bias in improving 
the success of change detection. It would be of interest to 
manipulate this bias in a more focused manner, specially 
using different types of stimulus materials. 
The obtained results could also partly reflect the nature 
of the used design. In this experiment, a within-subject ex-
perimental design in which all participants underwent all 
experimental conditions was used. Their knowledge about 
the existence of different conditions could have influenced 
their general strategies during responding. This would pri-
marily be reflected in the top-down attentional bias which 
is directly dependent on participants’ “collaboration”. In 
contrast, in the bottom-up conditions more salient stimuli 
should, in principle, attract participants’ attention regardless 
of their intentions.
Since the participants knew that the changes could occur 
anywhere in the two sets of numbers in all conditions, it is 
possible that, especially during the top-down manipulation 
they focused on more than the designated part of the screen. 
In this case, the strength of the top-down attentional fac-
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tor would be underestimated in the obtained findings. First 
of all, participants’ overall attentional focus would be more 
spread to both sets of numbers which could have lead to 
less facilitation in situations where the changes occurred in 
the attended set. Secondly, an improvement in performance 
would be expected with respect to the top-down interference 
condition. In the extreme case where the participants failed 
to follow the instruction, same performance would be ex-
pected in the baseline and conditions where only top-down 
bias was presented. In the present experiment top-down ma-
nipulation had an effect which indicates that the participants 
were following the instruction. However, it is not possible 
to exclude the fact that the knowledge of the presence of all 
conditions influenced their strategy. 
Similarly, participants were aware that changes could 
occur in either one of the sets, regardless of whether it was 
accentuated/attended or not. On one hand, this is obviously 
sub-optimal because they principally knew that follow-
ing the instruction in the top-down condition occasionally 
meant that it was more unlikely for them to solve the task. 
However, they were not aware of the probability of these 
cases. Although this was not ideal, the alternative of not ex-
plaining or explicitly deceiving the participants about this 
aspect of the task was not chosen because it was considered 
to be even more problematic. Since the participants’ task 
was such that they had to be explicitly aware of the change 
in order to correctly respond to it, deceiving participants 
would have only worked if it was possible to guarantee 
that they would never notice the change in the interference 
conditions. Once they did, it would have become obvious 
that the instruction was false. This would probably occur at 
different points in time for different participants and would 
trigger different “coping” strategies, leading to an increase 
in variance of their results. This was avoided by presenting 
all participants with equivalent instructions and stressing 
the importance of following them. 
The choice of stimuli, as well as the overall paradigm 
used in this experiment, allow only indirect comparison of 
the influence of different types of attentional biases. This 
question would be an interesting one to address in similar 
experiments, especially because some authors indicate that 
bottom-up attentional bias can only exist if an adequate men-
tal set is present, suggesting that it can be overridden by top-
down attentional bias (Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1993; 
Ruz & Lupiáńez, 2002). Our results are far from being con-
clusive regarding the relationship between these biases, so 
additional experiments are needed in which different stimuli 
and operationalizations of the manipulated biases would be 
used in order to make any more concrete conclusions. More 
rigorous probing of the nature of their interactions could be 
accomplished by balancing the relative strength of the two 
biases somewhat more systematically and across different 
types of materials.
CONCLUSION 
The obtained results indicate the importance of top-down 
attentional bias in detecting changes occurring at presented 
visual scenes. However, although the effect of bottom-up 
bias was not significant, the obtained pattern of results 
should be interpreted keeping in mind the operationalization 
of attentional biases. The obtained findings need to be ad-
dressed and verified through different paradigms and tasks 
within studies addressing mechanisms and neural bases of 
attentional biases in change detection.
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